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Abstract
COVID-19 pandemic is the first truly global crisis in the digital age. With death count worldwide reaching 586,000 merely
7 months after its first outbreak in China in late December 2019 and 13.6 million cases reported in 188 countries and
territories as of July 2020, this ongoing pandemic has spread far beyond domain of world health problem to become an
unprecedented challenge facing humanity at every level. In addition to causing social and economic disruptions on a scale
unseen before, it has turned the world into a site of biopolitical agon where science and reason are forced to betray
their impotence against cultish thinking in the planetary endgame depicted in so many dystopian science fictions. It is in
this context that this forum offers a set of modest reflections on the current impacts incurred by the COVID-19 virus.
Blending ethnographic observations with theory-driven reflections, the five authors address issues made manifest by the
crisis across different regions, while keeping their sight on the sociopolitical problems plaguing our life both individually
and collectively. Taken together, they provide a grounded documentary for the archive that the COVID-19 virus is
making us to construct.
Keywords
COVID-19, viruses, pandemic, global crisis

Coronavirus as a Ghost Writer of
Envoi (Li Lu)
The apparition of these faces in the crowd.
—Ezra Pound, “In a Station of the Metro”

The French word envoi is polysemic, defined as dispatch,
the action of sending, something that is sent, a poetic dedication or dedication of a literary work, and the marking of
the beginning of a process. This article is a dispatch from
Hubei, China, based on the author’s 4-month stay in his
hometown Qianjiang, a small city in the middle of Hubei,
during the Coronavirus pandemic. Firsthand observations
sent from the epicenter give us a clear picture of what the
coronavirus has done. Moreover, this article argues that
the coronavirus marks a spectral moment in which a
repressed trauma returns. There have been fierce debates
on the origins of the coronavirus and the political, economic, and social significances of the pandemic. Popular
representations of the coronavirus which isolate, stigmatize, and terrify the Other are symptoms of a returning
trauma, which is caused by bodily memories of being victims in past disasters. A Derridean reading of the envoi
highlights the inherent failure of sending: What is sent can
always be held up by a malfunctioning in the process of
the sending or postal system, and the meaning of the
trauma is lost. This traumatic failure results in a repetition

in representation and the return of what is sent to the
writer/sender. Proposing a supplement, this article foregrounds bodily knowledge acquired through social and
political trauma by virtue of fear of the coronavirus. This
fear of what is familiar reminds us of the feeling of the
uncanny. According to Freud and Derrida, the uncanny is
related to the spectral working of a hidden desire that
repeatedly returns as a haunting body, representation, and
history. This line of thinking helps us to better understand
conflicting representations of the coronavirus.
The coronavirus is a ghost. This is not merely a metaphorical proposition; this is accurate in the sense that the
coronavirus instantiates our phantasms, fears, and desires
toward ghosts. In this regard, Derrida’s Specters of Marx
provides us with a basic framework for understanding the
coronavirus as a ghost. The first teaching of Derrida is that
ghosts do not come at just any time but in spectral moments
that do not belong to time. By pointing precisely to the
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present or now-time, Derrida (2006) regards spectral time
as “a disjointed now that always risks maintaining nothing
together in the assured conjunction of some context whose
border would still be determinable” (p. 1). Second, a ghost
is a phenomenon in the game of repetition and difference.
Neither exclusively situated in life nor in death, neither visible nor invisible, a ghost is “the frequency of a certain visibility. But the visibility of the invisible. And visibility, by
its essence, is not seen, which is why it remains epekeina tes
ousias, beyond the phenomenon or beyond being” (Derrida,
2006, p. 125). Third, to “make oneself fear” is essentially
ineluctable in the experience of a ghost. One becomes
frightened of a ghost “on the condition that one can never
distinguish between the future-to-come and the comingback of a specter” (Derrida, 2006, p. 46). In other words,
what one fears is not the ghost, but the fear, imagination,
and one’s subject inspired by the ghost. Finally, “a ghost
never dies, it remains always to come and to come-back”
(Derrida, 2006, p. 123). Whatever repression the dead may
suffer, the return of the dead is anticipated, and “this
being-with specters would also be, not only but also, a
politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations”
(Derrida, 2006, p. xviii). In light of Derrida’s framework
on specters, once the coronavirus finds a host, it starts to
live a ghostly life.
The coronavirus pandemic irrupted during a time of turmoil. As the Chinese president Xi Jinping has expressed,
the world is experiencing profound shifts unseen in a century. While the trend of globalization is markedly receding,
nationalism, popularism, and isolationism are on the rise.
The eulogic discussions of “Chimerica,” a popular term
coined by the British epidemiologist Neil Ferguson in 2007,
are being replaced by the theories and practices of the
China–U.S. decoupling. The trade dispute between China
and the United States puts an end to the Chinese ideal of
Great Harmony in the world. In addition, as his campaign
slogan “America First” shows, Donald Trump epitomizes
the idea of American exceptionalism. In traditional Chinese
thinking, famine, natural disasters, and plague happen when
the political order or legitimacy are out of joint. During this
disjointed moment, a plague was anticipated, even fabricated before it came. According to a widely circulated story
in the We-media during the height of the coronavirus, Wang
Yongyan, an academician specializing in Chinese medicine
at the Chinese Academy of Engineering, predicted half a
year ago that a plague would come after the dongzhi (Winter
Solstice), one of the 24 Chinese solar periods. In addition,
he predicted that the plague would last until next spring. In
hindsight, rumors about a new virus were spreading right
after the dongzhi. Or, simply put, divination went hand in
hand with the plague during a time of disjointing, disjunction, or disproportion.
While scientists are still trying to track down patient
zero, conspiracy theories about the origins of coronavirus
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have been spreading. Bat soup and biological warfare are
on the top of the list of suspected criminals. Like ghosts, the
coronavirus takes shape in the game of visibility and invisibility. In this game, ways of seeing determine how a virus
can be understood. Approximately made up of 0.125
microns, the coronavirus can only be seen under an electron
microscope, made visible with the help of scientific equipment and representations. In contrast, a poet like Ezra
Pound sees the invisible through his gifted imagination. His
imaginative inspiration and aesthetic reflection allow his
keen observation to become a line of poetic beauty and philosophical complexity. Through this form of observation, an
invisible apparition becomes visible in the faces of the
crowd. Similarly, the depiction of a fictional killer-virus
called Wuhan-400 in Dean Koontz’s 1981 novel The Eyes
of Darkness, re-gained popularity among those who regard
it as an imaginative depiction of the coronavirus. In line
with this imaginative depiction, Mr. Wang, well-trained in
traditional Chinese medicine, claimed that his prediction
was based on his reading of the xiang (image) of the sky,
earth, plants, animals, and human beings. Visible to the
naked eye, xiang functions as the visible traces from which
an invisible plague becomes visible to an expert in traditional Chinese medicine. In other words, with scientific
support, talent, and training, people are able “to see this
invisibility, to see without seeing, thus to think the body
without body of this invisible visibility” (Derrida, 2006, p.
187). In this way, the ghostly nature of the coronavirus lies
in the different frequencies of its visibility.
However, despite our faith in being able to depict, and
make distinctions between, the invisible and the visible, the
way of seeing the coronavirus, especially in this time of turmoil, is politically conditioned and manipulated. When I
took a night bullet train to Wuhan with my family for vacation, it felt like an ordinary Chinese family reunion trip during the Spring Festival: carriages packed with passengers,
luggage, excitement, anxiety, and weariness in the air. One
of the reasons for the peaceful atmosphere was that China
and the United States had signed a trade agreement a few
days before, sending a false message to the world that rationality and peace would return. One thing was markedly
noticeable on the train: Most passengers wore a facial mask
for fear of an officially unidentified but unofficially SARSlike virus. To my surprise, a line of masked faces was
greeted at the exit by the smiling faces of relatives or
friends, the indifferent faces of railroad workers, and the
shrewd faces of barkers at the Hankou Railway Station.
This lack of consistency indicates that aspects of the coronavirus were kept secret. Furthermore, this scenario at the
station reminded me of a horrifying scene in the film The
Cassandra Crossing, an eye-opening disaster thriller for my
generation directed by George P. Cosmatos. In this harrowing film, an international express carrying a virus-infected
terrorist approaches a station at night. When the train
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reached the station, the passengers, who were kept from the
truth, were confronted with members of the U.S. army in
white biological hazard protective suits lined up on both
sides of the platform. In both cases, the dynamic of the visibility and the invisibility of a virus was of political significance. The facial masks and the protective suits were used
not only to protect people from a virus but also to make the
secret of the virus both visible and invisible. In other words,
political manipulation complicates the ways that a virus is
seen and how the coronavirus, in particular, is seen as a
political ghost.
The coronavirus pandemic frightened people because it
looked like the return of a specter, namely SARS. Because
of its fatality and residua, SARS remains an unresolved
trauma for many Chinese. At the early stages of the coronavirus pandemic, what was most frightening was its assumed
high fatality rate. Similarly, the short notice given for the
lockdown of Wuhan, a huge city of more than 10 million
residents, sent a clear message to everyone that the novel
coronavirus was the Grim Reaper. Corona, the brand of the
first car I owned and of the beer I had on my first visit to a
Mexican restaurant, was colored by images of a fearful
virus, deserted streets, calm officials on TV news channels,
and panicking crowds in Wuhan hospitals caught on video
by the We-media. Unlike the countries who proposed or
actually enacted herd immunity, the Chinese authorities
imposed very tough immunity measures, a lesson learned
from the 2003 SARS pandemic, when highways, the railway station, and docks in my hometown were closed overnight. Nursing homes were under quarantine; no visitors
were allowed in. Local authorities advised avoiding public
gatherings, including public square dancing and playing
majiang. The most popular forms of social activity, especially for retired people, were no longer available.
After the initial panic, it was discovered that the fatality
rate of the coronavirus was much lower than SARS.
According to the World Health Organization, the SARS
mortality rate worldwide was about 11%. In early February,
the Chinese authorities claimed that the coronavirus mortality rate in Wuhan was about 5%. Subsequently, what elicited fear in the population was the future-to-come,
particularly in the form of social unrest. On one hand,
stricter quarantine measures were implemented: All roads
were quickly blocked with cranes or tankers or stones; vehicles’ use was not allowed, unless a special permit was
issued; all grocery shops, markets, restaurants, and hotels
were shut down; residents were not allowed to exit their
residential areas except for grocery shopping at an arranged
supermarket. In addition, central and local authorities
watched closely for other concerns, such as food shortages
and the inflation of prices. Thanks partly to its rich agricultural products in a land of fish and rice, the impact of the
coronavirus on food supply and prices did not affect my
hometown. However, under the restrictions put in place, my
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hometown looked like a ghost town, and the uncertainty of
the future frightened people of all social strata.
In fact, what people fear most is that the coronavirus will
never die and will come back again and again, either in the
form of a future-to-come or a return of the dead. Regardless,
despite the medical or political ambition to eradicate the
coronavirus, we might have to accept the fact that the virus
will co-exist with us forever. For instance, the coronavirus
has been mutating, and the way the coronavirus replicates
itself in the cells of other organisms is ubiquitous. This
mechanism of repetition and difference functions both literally and metaphorically. On one hand, the coronavirus
reproduces itself through difference. Merely a collection of
genetic materials that seems to think with/like a human
once it infects its host, the virus induces a feeling of the
uncanny, a topic to which I will return later. In addition,
news sources reported that infected patients tested positive
again after they had been released from the hospital. Robert
Redfield, Director of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, admitted that some deaths from coronavirus have been discovered posthumously (CNN, 2020). In
other cases, the coronavirus acted like a whimsical tyrant
who inadvertently signed a death sentence. For example,
the only cases of death in my residential area was an old
couple who lived in an apartment very close to that of my
parents. They got infected by their son and daughter who
came back from Wuhan. What remained a mystery was that
the son and the daughter had stayed with their parents for
more than 20 days, much longer than the latent period of
coronavirus. Days after they were hospitalized, they died
one after another.
On the other hand, the coronavirus reproduces difference
in its host organisms. The neighborhood my mother lives in
is an acquittance community and an aging society. Cadres
and volunteers from the neighborhood committee have diligently attended to the needs of the old. Aware of the higher
fatality rate of the old, an ageist exhortation to quarantine
was broadcast repeatedly through a portable loudspeaker
placed at the gate of the neighborhood committee building.
As stigmatized targets, senior residents were susceptible to
the emotion of shame and, for this reason, chose to stay at
home. The use of broadcasts and the instigation of shame
illustrates how the coronavirus (re)produces, moderates,
and polices the line between the public and private spheres.
The coronavirus also changed the affective, moral, and
power economy of the family. The Spring Festival is supposed to be the perfect time for a temporary family reunion
of joy and harmony. When the lockdown continued longer
than everyone expected, generational conflicts broke out. In
extreme cases, the political infected families while they
were trying to contend with the coronavirus during quarantine. For example, Fang Fang, a veteran Chinese writer who
lived in Wuhan, posted her thoughts on life in quarantine on
her or her friend’s Weibo account. Those posts were later
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collected and published under the title Wuhan Diaries.
Public opinion on those posts varied and eventually led to a
political debate between left-wing and right-wing netizens,
eventually affecting family members who conflicted in
their attitudes toward the Wuhan Diaries.
Along with the coronavirus, the memory of personal,
generational, and political traumas returned. SARS, the
Cultural revolution, natural disasters, and national humilities were recurring themes in representations of the coronavirus. The suffering and trauma in the epicenter deserve an
envoi/dedication, and efforts have been made to achieve
this goal, such as daily national and international coverage,
Fang Fang’s Wuhan Diaries, and We-media postings. In
these kinds of representation, a rhetoric of “suffering as
sublime” is usually at play. In addition, stigmatizing the suffering of Others, or blaming the Other for one’s suffering, is
another kind of dedication. Both kinds of representations of
the coronavirus attempt to take the moral higher ground by
attempting to fix the coronavirus as a mere object awaiting
to be represented. No matter what position the representation takes toward the coronavirus and its significances, the
will to truth turns a dedication quickly into a testimony and
even a perjury.
A virus is an infectious agent that replicates only within
a host organism. For the host, a coronavirus is a deadly
stranger and an intimate family member at the same time.
Familiar, frightening, and secretive, the coronavirus
reminds us of the uncanny, as discussed by Freud. In his
pioneering study, Freud focused on the unsettling psychological state of the uncanny. Distinct from the feeling of fear,
the uncanny is a kind of terrifying feeling that is associated
with something known and familiar. After an etymological
investigation of the German words heimliche/unheimliche,
and a close reading of Hoffmann’s story “The Sand-Man,”
Freud (1964) unearthed the origins of the uncanny: “It may
be true that the uncanny [unheimlich] is something which is
secretly familiar [heimlich-heimisch], which has undergone
repression and then returned from it, and that everything
that is uncanny fulfills this condition” (p. 245). He also
associates the feeling of the uncanny “with the omnipotence
of thoughts, with the prompt fulfillment of wishes, with
secret injurious powers and with the return of the dead”
(Freud, 1964, p. 247). Following the lead of Freud, Derrida
worked on the concept of the uncanny to engage with
Marx’s concepts of repetition, specter, and fear. Refuting
the claims that the tenants of Marxism have died, Derrida
emphasizes the strange familiarity of the specter of Marxism
in the age of advanced capitalism. As Derrida insists, the
specter of Marxism will continue to return from the future
to visit us, to live with us, and to alert us. Similarly, Derrida
(2006) interprets the uncanny through the concept of absolute hospitality, in which “one may deem strange, strangely
familiar and inhospitable at the same time (unheimlich,
uncanny)” (p. 212). Remaining structurally open to future
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interpretation, the uncanny in Derrida’s account presupposes a materialism without substance, a messianic without
messianism.
Derrida’s understanding of the uncanny is critical to my
reading of the coronavirus as a ghostwriter of envoi. As a
ghostwriter, the coronavirus is a ghost who writes from the
future. As a stranger and a family member, it writes with and
in the place of the host. By writing an envoi, a kind of writing haunted by failure and repetition, the coronavirus makes
itself visible and frightening in a spectral moment. However,
the envoi is not exclusively governed by a ghostly logic that
is followed by and instantiated through the coronavirus. In
critiquing the tendency to unearth an ultimate truth, Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick & Frank (2003) regard affects as a possible way out of the binary opposition of truth and falsehood
in representation. By invoking the power of the performativity of shame, they highlight the negative affects neglected by
identity politics, dismissed and stigmatized:
Without positive affect, there can be no shame: only a scene
that offers you enjoyment or engages your interest can make
you blush. Similarly, only something you thought might delight
or satisfy can disgust. Both these affects produce bodily
knowledges. (Sedgwick & Frank, 2003, p. 116)

In their view, shame is neither subversive nor mandatory; it
works with other affects, drives, and representations to
adapt the body to its situation. Foregrounding bodily
knowledge acquired through trauma commits us to thinking differently about representation and the envoi in question. Fear of the coronavirus is not only the fear of a
returning trauma as a ghostly logic in representation. More
importantly, the coronavirus writes itself and writes about
bodily memories of trauma in a constant play of materialization: inscribing fear in itself and on the body of the host
permanently.
With the end of the lockdown in Hubei, the coronavirus
pandemic is almost over in China. However, the coronavirus has been sending, and will keep sending, its fearful
envoi.

When the Virus Is Not Just a Virus:
Nationalist Interpellation in a Global
Pandemic (Srinivas Lankala)
The enduring sign of the Coronavirus pandemic for Indians
was not related to medicine or public health. It was the
unprecedented exodus of migrant workers from metropolitan centers to their native rural districts, sometimes hundreds of miles away (Mukhopadhyay & Naik, 2020;
Petersen & Chaurasia, 2020). The scale of this migration
was vast and is still being understood. It certainly provokes
disturbing questions about urbanity and the fragility of a
political compact that kept people in their place through
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calibrated deprivation (Dahdah et al., 2020). But for our
purposes here, I will explore the ways in which it underscores the varying effects of the pandemic on different
classes of people and the diversity of its signification.
The virus in India is both a medical event to be dealt with
through appropriate public health measures and a mediated
discourse that has developed its own ramifications and
responses. I argue that both forms of the virus have had
tragic and miserable consequences, but on different classes
and groups of people. Like the televised Persian Gulf war of
1991 that Jean Baudrillard found to be a distinct and distorted signifier of the actual fighting on the ground,1 the
virus itself is not the same phenomenon once it is transformed into a signifier for other meanings and purposes.
The novel coronavirus later named COVID-19 emerged
in the public consciousness as a distinct problem with the
rapid rise in infections in several Indian states by February
2020. In March, the Government of India mandated an
immediate “lockdown” of the entire country. This new term
burned itself into the national consciousness and its many
vernaculars almost instantly, as its meaning became physically apparent. It involved the physical arrest of people
wherever they happened to be at the moment, and the prohibition of all commerce, traffic, and circulation. It was
announced with a 4-day notice period by the Prime Minister,
in an eerie echo of a similar announcement in 2016 of the
withdrawal of paper currency.2 That tragic farce had laid a
historical precedent for this second tragedy to come. As a
deeply iniquitous society and economy were forced to a
halt, the effect was expectedly unequal. Metropolitan Indian
citizens soon learned to cope with the new hardships of
“work-from-home,” homeschooling, online classes and
meetings, and such social-media-driven innovations as
cooking and cleaning without domestic servants and entertaining themselves in their houses and apartments. The government also encouraged the adoption of derivative coping
mechanisms as soon as they were observed in other countries: applauding medical workers from the safe confines of
apartment balconies and terraces; singing, chanting and
clanging metal plates and dishes with utensils in cacophonous, solidarity of the gated classes; lighting lamps and
candles; and waving mobile phone flashlights at appointed
times (Krishnan, 2020).
However, the actual effect of the virus became inseparable from the effect of the “lockdown.” The sudden impoverishment of the majority of the country’s population led to
starvation, medical neglect, and a national panic. While
invisible to the citizens in its first few weeks, it became
impossible to ignore, when workers across Indian cities
started to simply walk back to their native villages. Their
exit from cities also emphasized the fragility of urban
belonging: that in a crisis, Indian cities were fundamentally
empty shells, drawing people not through cosmopolitan
attractions or civic rewards but by rural misery.3 At this
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point, the virus was still largely a media phenomenon, while
the “lockdown” was what had directly affected most
Indians: The sudden disappearance of work, wages, commerce, and circulation magnified the precarity of urban
existence. The largely informal national economy quickly
unraveled in a crisis.
This crisis was exacerbated by the role of the virus in
continuing the ideological and political discourses of the
chaotic period immediately preceding the lockdown. The
use of the virus to carry out “politics by other means” can be
seen in other polities as well, but its entanglement with
Indian politics is particularly useful as a means to understand the virus as a set of signifying practices. The context
of this political use of the virus as a signifier is also inseparable from the highly mediatized nature of Indian politics
and society.4
The virus emerged as a discursive phenomenon in India
at a crucial juncture in a national conflict over changes to
the country’s citizenship laws. With the rise to national
power of the ruling Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS,
or the National Volunteers Organization—a fascist group
founded in 1922), India’s national government had been
attempting since 2014 to achieve its political goal of abolishing its secular and liberal constitution through a steady
dismantling of public institutions (Roy, 2020). This conflict
worsened in 2019 with the re-election of the RSS-controlled
government headed by the current Prime Minister, and the
consequent repeal of laws that had hitherto guaranteed the
autonomy of the occupied territory of Kashmir. This was
followed by a critical change to citizenship laws to specifically exclude Muslims from gaining Indian citizenship and
institute a new “citizens’ register” to determine afresh the
legal status of all residents.5 With reports of the parallel
construction of detention camps outside major cities, the
fascist inspiration and ominous intent of the new laws
became clearer and more immediate.6 Protests and political
resistance to the new measures emerged across the country,
and were met with violent responses from the police and
RSS groups. Matters had reached a head when the nationwide lockdown was suddenly imposed.
Except in a few Indian states such as Kerala, with still
functioning local health systems, the lockdown did not
involve any public initiative to test or prevent the spread of
the virus. Instead, in keeping with the ruling ideology of our
time, citizens were mandated to protect themselves, on pain
of being brutalized by the police if they failed. In this chaotic sauve qui peut scenario, the rhetoric of basic preventive
measures took on ominous ideological connotations
depending on who you were and where you lived. As it
became clear that only access to clean running water, adequate space, and a home to live in would guarantee the efficacy of the public health guidelines, medical advice became
meaningless for much of the country’s population, especially the inhabitants of vast informal urban settlements in
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the metropolitan cities. In effect, a dual situation emerged:
A parallel virus had infected the classes who lived in gated
urban communities and formal neighborhoods and who followed its progress in daily primetime news trackers.
Positive cases, testing ratios, death rates, and other numbers
soon flew across television and website screens in macabre
charts, graphs, and complex animations, as breathless studio anchors enthusiastically tracked the competitive fatalities across states, regions, cities, and countries. As the
formal state and civil society response to the virus grew
more and more into a media discourse, its actual effect on
the population was determined by existing social conditions
and ideological practices than by the ideals of public health.7
In the early period of its spread, the illusion of its control
was maintained through the interpellation of the mass television audience as ideal national subjects. In a series of
televised speeches, the Prime Minister exhorted citizens
to planned acts of mass discipline, such as the applause,
noise-making, and lamp-lighting exercises mentioned
earlier. It took several costly weeks for the citizens to
realize that this national son-et-lumière had only served
to deafen and obscure a different and more real virus that
had silently spread illness and death among urban populations who did not have houses or apartments with balconies. A starved public health system soon proved
inadequate and unprepared. Because this real crisis was
not mediated or televised, there was no appropriate or
meaningful response to it.
The easy congruity of the eagerly adopted virus prevention measures with the practice of caste-based rituals of discrimination was not lost on most Indians (George, 2020).
This fortunate coincidence enabled the easy normalization
of virus prevention as a legitimization of existing hierarchical practices. The convenient prescription of social distancing appeared to keep the privileged class of wealthy and
respectably middle-class white-collar workers as far away
as possible from the physical contact or proximity of their
social inferiors. The pandemic thus seemed tailor-made for
defenders of Hindu caste hierarchies, a righteous and suitably scientific legitimation of social discrimination.
The fantasy of caste purity would have remained an
abhorrent social remnant if it had not become part of state
policy in the last few years. But in the context of the stateled legitimation of religious hierarchies and the consequent onslaught on emancipatory laws, this entanglement
of the virus with caste and with the violent hate crimes
against Muslims acquired a dangerous dimension. It is
this distrust of and disgust with a compromised public
health system that drove so many Indians streaming out
of cities and into the relative safety of their impoverished
rural communities.
The alienation of Muslims as a national other has been a
part of the basic doctrine of India’s current ruling group
ever since its founders, awed by the Nazi policy of
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extermination, adopted a similar goal for the erasure of
non-Hindu communities in India. The mass protests and
popular uprising against the RSS’s attempts to irrevocably
alter the basic structure of the country’s republican constitution had reached a tipping point when the COVID-19
epidemic was suddenly deemed emergent enough to
impose an unprecedented “lockdown,” in effect a de facto
police state across the country.
The imposition of the lockdown allowed police to
destroy protest sites, detain protestors, and unleash a reign
of terror across Indian cities. Caught in the initial crossfire
were members of an apolitical Muslim religious group, the
Tablighi Jamaat, whose convention in Delhi had been interrupted by the lockdown. Jamaat members trapped in the
organization’s premises by the curfew were found to be
infected with the virus. The consequent media narrative of
the discovery of the infection among the Jamaatis veered
into the fantastical, with nightly news anchors debating the
strategies of a “corona jihad” that was to be waged by militant Muslims using the virus as a weapon (Perrigo, 2020).
This dog-whistle narrative of Muslim bodies as unclean
spreaders of a foreign disease dovetails with similar narrative frames used to portray Hindus from laboring and working castes as well.
The manufacture of conspiracies surrounding the coronavirus can be seen across the world and is not unique to
India. A disturbingly large proportion of Americans, for
example, appear to believe that the virus has been manufactured to enable mind-control through vaccination and
5G cellular signals by a ruling elite (Fisher, 2020). On rare
occasions, these conspiracies do spiral out into real effects
such as the bombing of cellular towers in Britain and the
anti-vaccination movement in the United States. In India,
however, the covert encouragement of such theories by the
state itself, to legitimize the hatred toward Muslims, exacerbates and normalizes the rumors as mainstream prime
time news which is then amplified and shared through an
organized social media campaign (Ellis-Petersen &
Rahman, 2020).
The vilification of the Muslim Other serves two purposes, one of furthering the state’s broader agenda of religious and caste purity, and the other more immediate goal
of providing a scapegoat for the inescapable rise in infections and deaths due to the virus and the inability of the state
and society to understand the crisis.
The brutal police crackdown that accompanied the lockdown and the violence of its imposition across the country
were a small reminder of the routinization of the “lockdown” as a way of life in the occupied valley of Kashmir,
part of the only Muslim-majority state in the Indian Union.
The effects of the police state as a normalized entity have
been multiplied since the abrogation in 2019 of constitutional laws guaranteeing the region’s autonomy, even if
such laws were honored more in the breach in preceding
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decades (Zia, 2020). The uncanny resemblance of a public
health curfew to a military occupation is not coincidental,
but the result of the colonial origins of both, and of the state
institutions they represent.
The symbiotic existence of caste-based discrimination,
the extermination of a religious minority, and the colonial
occupation of an entire province within the same body politic is made possible by the continuous interpellation of the
mass of people to become national citizen-subjects. This
call to obedience, broadcast daily through primetime television and magnified through the near-mandatory use of
mobile phones,8 is the only sign of a nation-state that is otherwise absent in the real world. The failure to stop the
spread of the real virus is obscured as the interpellated citizen is urged, cajoled, and threatened to participate in the
simulacral fight against a mediated virus in a purely semiotic realm. The washing of hands without the precious reality of running water, the maintenance of “social distance” in
the absence of space, the exhortation to “work from home”
for a population that is not housed, and the discourses of
online socialization and commerce are all much more than
signs of mere denial: They are the components of this new
semiotic space, enabling the call to national belonging in a
new domain, bereft of its mooring in the world.
From a broader historical perspective, the coronavirus
epidemic does not appear to have affected Indians as
much as the far greater fatalities caused by more prosaic
diseases, hunger, and the increasingly toxic air and water
(Rukmini, 2020). What has caused the greatest pain and
panic is the response to the epidemic. This response has
been not to the virus itself, but to a simulacral virus that
appears to occupy the same space and shares the same
name as COVID-19, but which is a mere signifier, pointing to other, older evils. Like Baudrillard’s hyperreal war,
it has surpassed the real virus itself and has come to
occupy its place. It cannot be wished away or prevented
with a vaccine, it needs a response in kind: of new counter-signs and counter-discourses.

Reimagination of East Asia in the
Chinese Public Discourse of COVID-19
(Yuan Gong)
A catastrophic pandemic unseen in a century, the current
raging of COVID-19 around the globe has undoubtedly
produced a unique symbolic site for global, regional, and
national imaginations. As the earliest epicenter of this infectious illness, China has witnessed the proliferation of discourses about the evolution of the pandemic on various
media platforms, through which the Chinese public has the
rare chance to reflect on important issues regarding identity
construction, social reformation, and nation building. While
much attention has been paid to the stigmatization of China
in Euro-American politics, media, and everyday whisper
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that label the natural coronavirus as a cultural and ethnic
fault (Fu, 2020), what has been overlooked is how China
has portrayed other countries in this global health crisis,
especially those surrounding nation-states in the same geopolitical area. East Asia, or the Sinosphere in the broader
sense, with the collective memory of fighting SARS in
2003, is thought to have responded to COVID-19 more efficiently than many Western countries (Salmon, 2020). How,
then, is the East Asian encounter with COVID-19 depicted
in the Chinese public discourse? How does such depiction
envisage China’s relations with neighboring countries and
its position in the area?
In this essay, I discuss the ways in which the coronavirus
pandemic has been appropriated by the Chinese public for a
(re)imagination of East Asia. By exploring the evolving
representations of its neighboring countries throughout the
epidemic on Chinese media platforms including Weibo,
WeChat, and Zhihu, I argue that the talk of the regional
responses to COVID-19 envisions a China-centered union
of selected East Asian countries in parallel with the historical tributary system of the Sinosphere. Through the expression of the nostalgia for Imperial China, the discursive
reconstruction of the East Asian identity is a ratification of
China’s contemporary ambition to reclaim its geopolitical
dominance.

Mutual Support for Regional Crisis
Synchronized with the rapid transmission of the coronavirus in China and East Asia between January and March
2020, the Chinese public in this early phase drew close
attention to the unfolding of the epidemic in its nearby
countries, and Japan and South Korea in particular. With the
disease breakout involving Diamond Princess (Japan) and
Shincheonji Church of Jesus (South Korea) frequently making news headlines, the discussions of how those countries
responded to COVID-19 flourished online, which, in combination with the continuous debates over China’s own pandemic threat management, contributed to the imagination of
the COVID-19 rampancy as a regional challenge that China
and its neighbors faced together.
Central to the discursive formation of this imagined community was the celebration of the incessant interaction and
cooperation between China and some East Asian countries
to combat the virus collectively. In the wake of the outbreak
when China was threatened by the crumbling of its health
care system, the countries under the spotlight—Japan and
South Korea—were widely appraised for the sympathetic
and supportive approaches they took to help China overcome the severe shortage of medical resources. The media
reports of Japanese and South Korean governments leading
the international aids to China (Gong, 2020) were echoed by
numerous warm anecdotes on social media championing the
heartfelt support from their people. Perhaps the most
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well-known story of this kind, a Japanese institution wrote a
Chinese-language verse on the boxes of masks it donated to
the province of Hubei: “Rivers low, mountains high; The
same moon in the sky” (trans. Zhao, 2020) (“山川异域，风
月同天”), which immediately went viral online because of
its signification of the long-lasting friendship between China
and Japan. According to Account of the expedition to the east
by the Great Master (唐大和上东征传) written by Omi no
Mifune (淡海三船) (see Wong, 2018), this sentence was
from an ancient poem written on the edges of the Buddhist
robes Japanese missions (遣唐使) brought to Tang China as
the tribute from Prince Nagaya (長屋王). Given its profound
roots in the history of Japanese envoys to Imperial China
learning from the Chinese culture and civilization, this verse
went beyond re-fostering the traditional Sino-Japanese solidarity. Analogizing Japan’s mask donation with ancient
Japanese envoys’ gifts, it also evoked the retrospective commemoration of the hierarchy between China and Japan in
history which almost vanishes in the modern era. Therefore,
the popularity of this verse may indicate the aspiration for
the reoccurrence of such bi-lateral relations.
Indeed, this was only one example of the ubiquitous
imaginary of the pan-East Asian cooperation and exchange
of goods and information as a modern emulation of the tributary system through which Imperial China maintained its
diplomatic and trade relations to neighboring countries and
consolidated its dominance in the region for over a millennium. After China started to keep the pandemic under control and resume the production of medical supplies, this
metaphor was further perpetuated in an attempt to accentuate that China’s supplies of medical goods and anti-epidemic lessons to nearby countries drastically outnumbered
what it was initially given. On Weibo, China’s return of
masks and respirators to its neighbors was often explicitly
compared with the “vassals’ gifts” Chinese emperors
assigned to tributary states in posts like this:
Tribute is both the highest form of alliance and an advanced
way of investment, but (this time) it is based on masks!
Recently, Xinwu District in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province donated
50,000 to Toyokawa, Aichi Prefecture in Japan in return for the
4,500 masks, protective clothing and other anti-epidemic
materials Toyokawa donated to Xinwu District in February.
(Weibo source, March 25, 2020)

This nostalgic use of metaphor implies a crucial undertone of Sinocentrism of the public imagination of the community comprising China and bordering countries fighting
against the coronavirus. The tracing of the origin of East
Asian solidarity to the past is suggestive of the ambition of
the present. The Chinese public not only fantasizes about a
reunion of China, Japan, and South Korea for COVID-19
but more importantly yearns for the recovery of their
nation’s leadership and centrality in this battle.

Victory of the “Confucius East”
As the coronavirus expands rampantly to the rest of the
world from March 2020 onward, Chinese media coverage
quickly catches up with the shift of the epicenters from East
Asia to Europe and North America and reformulates the
pandemic as a global health crisis. Against the depiction of
how COVID-19 created chaos, helplessness, and dysfunction in Western societies stands the stark contrast of East
Asia as a safer zone where the outbreaks have been largely
contained with success. With the similar control of cases
less than 20,000, Japan and South Korea remain at the heart
of this imagined safe zone in company with China even
though the reality has seen even fewer confirmed cases in
other parts of Asia as well as the recent resurgence of virus
spreading in all these three countries.
This rhetoric is in concert with the prevalence of online
deliberations about why East Asia as an area has performed
better than other parts of the globe in the containment of the
virus. At the core of these discourses lies the construction of
an East/West binary which frames the global responses to
the pandemic into a competition in which “We” (the East/
East Asia) have triumphed “Them” (the West/EuroAmerica). Although China and neighboring countries
diverge in the official approaches to handle the pandemic,
their relative efficiency in virus containment in comparison
with the West is considered to be guided uniformly by the
cultural values they share as part of the “Confucius East.” In
particular, collectivism—the principles of prioritizing community interests to personal interests, pursuing social harmony, compliance to authority, avoid causing inconvenience
to others—has been glorified as the main drive for the people in East Asia to more effectively cope with the governmental strategies in contact tracing, testing, social
distancing, and mask wearing. Similarly, the regional cooperation in the pandemic management is regarded as a manifestation of these values. For example, the reflections on
how South Korea has set a model of disease control using
mass tracing and testing tend to recognize the smooth
uptake of this procedure facilitated by Koreans’ collectivist
mind-set that downplays individual privacy and complies
with the data-mining measures to track and publicize their
locations, activities, and close contacts. Meanwhile, other
popular discussions blame the religiosity of the Shincheonji
Church members whose gatherings caused the initial
COVID outbreak in South Korea, which is reflected from
the titles of Zhihu posts that describe the diffusion of the
virus through “Hallelujah” such as “The occupation of
South Korea by Covid-19, everything has to start from
‘Hallealia’” and “South Korean cult Hallelujah devastated
the country.”
Apparently, these titles have no intention to mask the
underlying tone mocking at the role of Christianity in the
acceleration, not mitigation, of disease spreading, which
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further serves as a foil to the power of Confucianism to help
South Korea navigate away from the disaster. In fact, satire
targeting at Christianity represents the broader criticism of
Western cultural values in hindering the efficacious enforcement of restrictive and surveilling measures against the
coronavirus. The East Asian identity is thus reaffirmed
through the clashes between the Eastern and Western civilizations. However, it is worth noting that the narratives
about the East Asian conquest of COVID-19 are again permeated with the metaphor of the tributary system delineating China as the leader and role model in this imagined
“safe zone.” Not only does the attribution of the regional
success to Confucianism call up the historical Chinese centrality in the Sinosphere but the emphasis on China’s ability
to offer lessons and instructions from its early experience
for its neighbors to benefit from also ratifies the restoration
of the “teacher/student” relation between Imperial China
and pre-modern Japan and Korea.

A Process of Inclusion and Exclusion
Far from a total reenactment of the historical Sinosphere,
this Chinese imaginary of East Asia engages with a purposeful selective process that amplifies China’s solidarity
with some East Asian countries but simultaneously mutes
others in the same region. As remarked earlier, a majority of
the online narratives about the cooperative responses to
COVID-19 in East Asia revolves around China, Japan, and
South Korea, with less frequent inclusion of Singapore as
well as occasional reference to such countries as Mongolia
and Myanmar. This emphasis on forming a coalition with
Japan and South Korea is compatible with China’s longterm agenda of promoting and dominating the China–
Japan–South Korea union (中日韩一体化), which was
recently reiterated by the three governments’ consensus to
speed up the negotiation of the free trade zone (中日韩自贸
区) (Wang, 2019). In this sense, the COVID-19 crisis has
offered a discursive site for the Chinese state to rebuild this
trilateral bond and remodel its significant neighbors whose
national images, due to the respective disputes around
Diaoyu Islands and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense), have been negative in China for almost a decade.
While the China–Japan–South Korea triangle is romanticized in connection with other small countries, the alienation of some Confucius societies from this imagined
“cooperative” East Asia is quite striking, especially given
the outstanding results some of them have produced in the
prevention of disease transmission. The first excluded category includes Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau—the territories outside the mainland in the Great China area. Whereas
Macau is often forgotten by the media as it has always been,
both Taiwan and Hong Kong are widely criticized and
mocked for their attempt to politicize the pandemic as a
weapon to confront Beijing and increase international
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recognition. The second group pertains to North Korea and
Vietnam—the authoritarian states that have close political
and ideological bonds with China. For instance, North
Korea has been constantly questioned and satirized because
of the lack of transparency in the disclosure of its epidemic
circumstances. Vietnam’s outstanding handling of the virus
which led to only 334 confirmed cases and 0 death was
nearly silenced in the mainstream media coverage. In the
unusual reference to Vietnam in some Zhihu conversations,
Vietnam’s success was rarely celebrated but considered as a
“threat” to China’s leadership in containing the pandemic in
the area.
The trivialization and exclusion of these countries/
regions from the Chinese imagination of East Asia as a collective force fighting against COVID-19 is not unexpected.
In the first place, the negative attitudes toward them (except
Macau) reflects a backlash against the restrictive, noncooperative methods those governments have enforced to
block the virus from mainland China (e.g., full border closure; ban on exports of medical supplies), which signifies
their resistance to be incorporated into the modern tributary
system Chinese people have aspired. Yet for Taiwan and
Hong Kong, this exclusion repeats the endeavor of Chinese
official propaganda to erase the distinction between them
and the mainland and disavow their political autonomy.
Instead of being completely out of the picture, their
responses to the coronavirus are mainly discussed as part of
the Chinese experience to consolidate the national identity.
For North Korea and Vietnam, the negative impression may
partly result from China’s ongoing diplomatic conflicts
with them in recent years regarding the South China Sea
and denuclearization, respectively. Nevertheless, the shaking of the “socialist brotherhood” on the matter of COVID19 also implies the reluctance of the Chinese public to
articulate a regional identity around the axis of a shared
political regime. In fact, assimilating itself with ideological
and political allies is likely to obscure the focus of this
imaginary on China’s historical and cultural alignment with
Japan and South Korea.

Epilogue
As COVID-19 begins to shift both the scholarly and media
focus on an international scale to reconsidering the dark
sides of globalization (Chan & Haines, 2020) and mourning for the disruption of European Union (Trofimov &
Pancevski, 2020), China’s reversed agenda of imagining a
regional union is stunningly intriguing. On one hand, the
eagerness to build solidarity with East Asian countries
represented by Japan and South Korea might be a strategy
to react to the racialization of COVID-19 as a “Chinese
virus” and the demonization of China as a “public enemy”
and “trouble maker” in the Euro-American political and
media agenda (Viala-Gaudefroy & Lindaman, 2020). By
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articulating China’s resemblance (and collaboration) with
the bordering democratic capitalist states (rather than the
“socialist brothers”) in the “Confucius-inspired” success
of halting the virus, the public discourse strives to construct a collective identity of the East so as to brush off
China’s label of the Other imposed by the Western imagination. Ironically, this consolidation of the Eastern identity also serves as a repercussion to otherize the West as
the loser to the coronavirus.
On the other hand, the rise of this East Asian imaginary
centering around China’s historical and cultural bonds with
Japan and South Korea has far-reaching implications for
China’s geopolitical strategies beyond the COVID-19 pandemic and the realm of public health. Rested upon the trope
of the imperial tributary system, this imagination reflects
how the Chinese public discourse echoes the state ambition
to recuperate the historical dominance of China in the
Sinosphere, which is part of Chinese Communist Party’s
long-term project of “the great revival of the Chinese nation”
(中华民族伟大复兴), or in Xi Jinping’s term, the “Chinese
Dream” (中国梦). Incorporating Japan and South Korea—
the most important American allies in East Asia—into the
imagined tributary network might serve the specific purpose
of weakening the U.S. hegemony in the region (see Ikenberry,
2004), whereas the tactic exclusion of North Korea and
Vietnam indicates the indifference of many Chinese to the
state’s political and ideological “comrades” (whose traditional alliance with China has often proven itself unstable
and delusionary in the changeable economic and political
dynamics in East Asia). More importantly, this selective reimagination of the Eastern union expresses the Chinese public’s nostalgic ideal of the nation’s revival, which dreams of
a return to the Middle Kingdom, the empire that reunites and
leads East Asia through culture and history.

Making Viruses Matter (Xuefeng Feng)
The Toxic Present
During the year 2020, which is anticipated to be the warmest year in human history, we failed to stop the rampant
spread of a coronavirus called COVID-19 and its disastrous impact on societies and individual lives. Unlike its
“cousin” SARS, which broke out in early 2003 and vanished into thin air largely because of rising temperatures,
the current respiratory epidemic has yet to show any sign
of amelioration with the arrival of summer.
News photos have shown audiences an incredibly
bleak, bizarre, and somewhat surreal picture of life during
the pandemic. Streets are evacuated. Stores are closed.
Public services are paralyzed. Modernized cities have
become empty and ghostly quiet. Only scattered people
equipped with medical face masks walk anxiously in this
futurist, apocalyptic scene.
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To use Timothy Morton’s concept, the COVID-19 pandemic has become a “hyperobject,” a phenomenon that possesses an ahuman time scale and an extremely diffused
quality in occupying space. In such a space–time reconfiguration, or, in plain language, during this type of disaster,
humankind becomes an obsolete idea, as humans no longer
play a meaningful role in the space–times created by and for
“hyperobjects.” Unfortunately, such a concept bares relevance in light of the uncontrollable proliferation of the
coronavirus across the globe at this juncture.
Worse still, some epidemiologists warn that a new round
of outbreak will likely occur soon in the coming fall. A possible scenario could repeat the conditions after the 3/11
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, when breathing with
face masks, people eventually became accustomed to a state
of emergency as the conditions for living and dying in the
Anthropocene. “[P]oison has become a normal feature of
daily life, the second nature we have to inhabit” (Berardi,
2012, p. 12). While one can attribute the deterioration of
nature to neoliberalism and its disastrous governance, this
essay, rather, speculates on what foregrounds the involutional relationship between humans and the earth beyond
the “nature-culture” divide. Whether one is willing to admit
or not, viruses are neither creation ex nihilo nor culturally
and politically constructed representation. Instead, they are
beings that have always been part of earth’s composition.

Neither Object nor Subject
In a prophetic book, The Natural Contract, the late
Philosopher Michel Serres (1995) describes the evolution
of the earth’s composition. In ancient law and modern science, nature was treated as an objective reference point,
because it had no subject. Existing objectively “out there,”
the earth was a space that did not depend on humans but
only acted passively in relation to causality. Yet, witnessing
the ecological crisis arising in the 20th century, humans
realized that the earth has been affected by our behavior and
is now behaving like an aberrant subject! In recent scholarship, this subject has been referred to as Gaia, the capricious
goddess of the earth (see Latour, 2014, p. 3).
The earth is full of action and so is COVID-19. As
described in news reports, the coronavirus looks for and
hijacks its hosts; it finds easy purchase on, and takes control
of, human bodies; it kills many, but not all, of its hosts so as
to keep moving, spreading, replicating, and surviving. It
would be impossible to talk about the virus without referring to those actions. Cited by the Washington Post, a virologist came up with a vivid analogy for viruses by comparing
them with destructive burglars. “They break into your
home, eat your food, use your furniture and have 10,000
babies” (Kaplan et al., 2020).
As the word “object” refers to entities that are inanimate
and subject to chains of causality, viruses, in this sense,
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hardly fit into this definition. For instance, COVID-19
remains mostly enigmatic, not least because it is considered
strikingly sneaky—“the virus doesn’t really want to kill us.
It’s good for them, good for their population, if you’re
walking around being perfectly healthy,” said another virologist in the same Washington Post article (Kaplan et al.,
2020). Besides doing things such as breaking-into, eating,
and having-babies, the virus is further endowed with intentions—it does not want to kill us!
However, the coronavirus should not be mistaken for a
subject, especially a subject–agent, which is historically
associated with liberal humanism since the Enlightenment
and which is deeply rooted in the “nature-culture” divide,
an ontological regime referred to by Latour as “the Modern
Constitution” (see Latour, 1993b). The idea of the subject as
a product of Euro-American modernity is indivisible from
its aim to achieve individual sovereignty and autonomy. In
a politico-legal sense, bounded individualism is the most
evolved form of this idea in the wake of the global expansion of capitalism. Faced with an unprecedentedly active
earth in the late 20th century, nonetheless, this anthropocentric conception of the subject–agent has been confronting
exponential challenges, among which the current coronavirus pandemic constitutes the latest one. To be clear, the term
“subject” is a mismatch for COVID-19, not because it is
agentless and incapable of doing the same things that
humankind does. The contrary is true: The state of being of
the virus—what it is—can unfold only through its actions
and long after its performances. At stake for the virus and
humans is that there are “no pre-constituted subjects and
objects, and no single sources, unitary actors, or final ends”
(Haraway, 2003, p. 6) Far from being a de-animated object,
or an anthropomorphized subject, Gaia, the increasingly
“rioting” earth, is a collective of actions that distributes
agency in heterogeneous and surprising ways. As a result,
“we must not believe in advance that we know whether we
are talking about subjects or objects, men or gods, animals,
atoms, or texts” (Latour, 1993a, p. 167), and also viruses
until their actions are captured, and rendered into shapes—
whether the shape of a human or of a virus.

Staying With the Trouble!
The story of the human-centered history is being replaced
by an explosion of narratives about the increasingly animated and animating earth. However, the dualism of the
subject versus the object, unfortunately, is still perniciously
conserved in the mainstream reaction to the COVID-19
pandemic. When societies are forced to act on the pandemic, the virus is almost exclusively treated as an object
subject to the chain of causality.
This tendency is clearly reflected in the mobilization of
wartime rhetoric and discourses in conjunction with governments’ anti-epidemic measures. For instance, when
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visiting Wuhan right after its lockdown, Sun Chunlan,
China’s Vice Premier, warned that the country was facing
“wartime conditions.” Likewise, only 1 month later,
President Donald Trump declared a national state of emergency over the coronavirus outbreak in the United States.
In this antagonistic discourse, contending with the virus, a
not-yet-tamed and potentially threatening other, is framed
as a relationship between humans and their enemies. For
those who believe humans and only humans make history,
a self-proclaimed war on the virus is unavoidable! Peace,
accordingly, is only imaginable to be reached, or more precisely restored, to an already existing order, established
primarily for humans.
Mobilized to describe the relationship between COVID19 and humans, “war” is a terrible and even dangerous
choice in terminology, due to its undertone of human exceptionalism. In fact, nearly 90% of the cells in a human body
is “part of a vast community of companion species, particularly bacteria and viruses” (Smart & Smart, 2017, kindle
72). Unfortunately, most humans have yet to learn the
meaning of living and becoming-with these beings who are
made by and making humans at the same time.
In her book Staying With the Trouble: Making Kin in the
Chthulucene, Donna Haraway (2016) invites readers to
contemplate our troubling present, the Chthulucene, an
emerging regime of naturecultures, as opposed to the
“nature-culture” divide. Contrasting to the discourse of the
Anthropocene and the Capitalocene, both of which are
conceived as human-induced condition, the “Chthulucene”
is, first and foremost, concerned with earth beings who live
in “manifold forms and manifold names in all the airs,
waters, and places of earth”—they are monsters which
“demonstrate and perform the material meaningfulness of
earth processes” (Haraway, 2016, p. 2). The vicious coronavirus is evidently one of these monsters. Despite the
havoc it is creating in the present, the epidemic is a manifestation of the biotic and abiotic powers inherent in earthly
actors and is part of “ongoing multispecies stories . . . in
times that remain at stake” (Haraway, 2016, p. 55). As
implied by the title, one of the valuable lessons of
Haraway’s book is that, for humans in particular, there
might be no better option other than to stay with troubles,
of which humans are never innocent.
Staying with the troubles demands caring for all the
threads that bind us together and make our existence possible in the first place—humans are made by countless earth
beings and vice versa. It also means that we are required to
weave unexpected and even dangerous connections with
others, in Haraway’s (2016) words, making kin as oddkin
“in unexpected collaborations and combinations . . . We
become-with each other or not at all” (p. 4). This insight is
particularly useful for thinking about viruses. Because
viruses have “no cellular machinery of their own, they
become intertwined with ours. Their proteins are our
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proteins” (Kaplan et al., 2020). In this sense, the evolution
of humans and viruses is inseparable from the process of
involution of the two into one. In other words, becomingwith means that, by definition, a “we” always precedes an
“I,” a “you,” or a “they.”
The so-called “asymptomatics” provide an excellent
example of this point. Asymptomatics refer to those who
test positive for COVID-19 but, confusingly, do not suffer
from illness or show any symptom of the disease.
Asymptomatic infections or carriers are possibly greater in
number than those with symptoms. At this point, it is impossible to decide which of the two types is more typical of
COVID-19 infections, because, as a researcher at the
University of Oxford says, “there is not a single reliable
study to determine the number of asymptomatics”
(Shukman, 2020). In the same news report, Neil Hall, a biomedical expert, suggests considering asymptomatic cases
of the coronavirus as the “dark matter” of the epidemic, as
invisible and not-yet identified dark matter is believed to
make up most of the matter in the universe.
Despite the fact that no conclusion has been reached
about the enigmatic phenomenon of asymptomatics, the differences that manifest among patients reveal that the virus,
and the particular cases of infection, should be examined as
specific units. In other words, between the virus and
humans, the specificity of an encounter matters. Unlikely to
be autopoietic systems that reproduce autonomous units,
the virus and an infected body constitute a collectively produced, sympoietic system that does not have self-defined
spatial or temporal boundaries. In these cases, and from a
non-anthropocentric, philosophical point of view, the idea
of bounded individualism has to be discarded for good.
Beyond the divide between the subject and the object, what
emerges are ontologically heterogeneous practitioners who
are involved in each other’s lives. Besides evolution, living
also relies on involution.
Without any intention of “romanticizing” COVID-19
and the current pandemic, staying with the trouble, as articulated by Haraway (2016), is “to make kin in lines of inventive connection as a practice of learning to live and die well
with each other in a thick present” (p. 1).

Mattering Viruses
The coronavirus does not happen as a matter of fact, which
“passively” waits to be discovered, investigated, tamed, or
neutralized by “active” humans. What we call the COVID19 pandemic manifests itself as a differentiating and relational effect because it matters by bringing into being
various relations between humans, and between humans
and their oddkin. In this view, science is only one practice
among many others to capture the efficacy of its mattering.
In addition to biomedical measures, a more critical question
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for the coronavirus crisis is “what method does the matter
demand” (Thompson, 2018, p. 13)? Proposed by Haraway
for living in the Chthulucene, the string figure might also
serve as an appropriate method and image for the pandemic,
characterized by its exceptional contagiousness and interactivity. Consisting of “passing on and receiving, making and
unmaking, picking up threads and dropping them,” the
string figure is all about “becoming-with each other in surprising relays” (Haraway, 2016, p. 3). Crucial to this method
is that it does not guarantee what is obtained turns out to be
good in the end, because living itself has become so dangerous in this very thick present—agencies are distributed,
conflicting, and entangled in a myriad of practitioners,
human and non-human alike.
In this pandemic, we are all playing the game of string
figures with our oddkin. It is not beneficial to judge in
advance who is a subject and who is an object, or which one
is active and which one passive, as all participants might be
capable of something that matters in one way or another. For
example, one thing that the respiratory disease teaches us is
that not only breathing matters but also the manner how one
breathes matters to others. Life and death happen inside specific connections and their mattering in mundane, and even
fleeting, encounters. Making COVID-19 matter requires us
to reanimate “what is coming into states of matter and mattering in bodies, stories, acts, and events” (Stewart, 2018, p.
24), in other words, in the vicissitudes of our ordinary lives.
For the future of this thick present, one key is to stop imagining the crisis of the coronavirus as something wholly predicated on effective vaccines and scientific solutions. Instead,
humans must learn to connect and also care for threads,
some of which are obvious, some elusive, some vicious and
dangerous, and some fictional. We may need to discard
terms such as “overcoming” or “solution,” and turn to terms
like “participation” concerning all that we are uncertain of
but have to live and become with, together, in the “metamorphic zone” called the earth (Latour, 2014, p. 13).

Of Viruses and Men (Briankle G. Chang)
What does it mean, the plague? It is life, that is all.
—Albert Camus, The Plague

The most abundant biological entities on Earth, viruses are
forever and everywhere. Suspended between living and being
dead, they are simply there, a slimy strip of ribonucleic acid
(RNA), as biologists tell us. Poorer in life than tardigrades,
incapable of movement, and having no logistic of their own,
they ride on and feed off others to replicate themselves, to
become the viruses that they are. As smart schoolchildren
know, they are transmissible and must be so transmitted as to
go viral, to become the viruses as we know them.
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Viral Media
Dependent entirely on carriers, that is, exploiting others’
hospitality, without which they have no life (but also no
death either), viruses exemplify transmissibility. They live
and thrive, as it were, only if their hosts are susceptible, in
motion, and in contact and they die or die down when susceptible hosts are either unavailable or no longer hospitable.
Defined, that is, made finite, by transmissibility, and yet
transcending its barren finitude through parasitism, viruses
exist and operate like pure media, self-generating and selfgenerated by being entirely coterminous with the channel
through which they flow and multiply. Interpolating and
encoding themselves in the metabolic cycle of others,
thereby reproducing themselves passive-actively, they
mediate by colonizing others and, in so doing, mediate
themselves by proxy, going about so energetically and
indiscriminately as to cause the demise and thus thwarting
unwittingly their own propagation. If viruses communicate
anything, if their shadowy occupation of host bodies sends
any message, it is their very own communicability, their
ability to disseminate themselves over a large population
with effort less than minimal.
Although all over creation and in abundance, most of
the viruses cause us no harm and we pay them little attention, even though they populate our body and capitalize on
its resources. They become a matter of grave concern
when they infect us, when they not only put themselves
inside (in-ficere) our body and stain its normal functioning, but also threaten to afflict as many people as their
“infectivity” attacks. More dangerous and less tamable
than most microbes, viruses invade our body and compromise it at the cellular level. They do not just make us sick;
they bring about plague.
Once seen as a cause of infection, viruses accrue significance and take on the label “pathogens.” To refer to viruses
as pathogens implies that they are “medicalized,” that they
not only enter into a relation with humans who regard them
as toxic and virulent, but are also seen as a problem to be
addressed in a methodical, systematic, that is, “scientific,”
manner. It is through this medicalization that viruses are
individuated and identified as a distinct biological entity
and, having been so captured and given a name—for example, H1N1, Mers-CoV, SARS-CoV-2, COVID-19, and the
like—by what might be called the “clinical gaze” and its
taxonomic procedures, they enter into sciences and become
a focus of medical research, made all the more pressing if
and when they create public health crisis. More than one
hundred years after Martinus Beijerinck gave the name contagium virum fluidum (contagious living fluid) to the incitant of Tobacco mosaic first discovered by Adolf Mayer and
Dimitri Ivanovsky, viruses are now actively collected, classified, and manipulated by scientists in highly restricted
spaces called laboratories, most of which, like the viruses
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housed carefully therein, are hidden from public eyes.
While slimy poisons were once thought to be sent down by
God to punish us for our sins, we now see viruses not only
as an object of scientific investigation but also as a medical
challenge that nature poses to us as biological creatures on
Earth. Like birds, bats, and rats, we are all equal opportunity hosts to killer germs.

Pandemics, Unde Venistis?
Not all viruses are fully pathogenic, but pathogenic viruses
are ever ready to go viral when the conditions are ripe.
However, although viral infection may break out and spill
over, it does not mean that there is a pandemic.
“Pandemics,” as virologists tell us, “begin when a brandnew virus infects a human who also at that point is able to
transmit the virus to other humans” (Buettner, 2020). Two
points should be noted without delay. First, pandemics are
not created by transmission of viruses from some source to
humans, but from humans to humans. Breakouts of viral
infections among members of a primate community deep
in the Amazon rainforests, for example, may be large scale
and may disturb ecological balance alarming to conservationists, but they do not for all that count as pandemics in
the sense that the term is properly used. Viruses might
infect one or more individuals, but humans are responsible
for creating the conditions that transform infections to outbreaks and outbreaks into pandemics. Pandemics, in other
words, are not natural or biological phenomena; they name
a human crisis, a contagious malady plaguing humans
who are both agents and patients at the same time.
Contagious diseases are disastrous to all, locked, as we
are, in the same bubble in which microbes live and grow,
but pandemics are decidedly more pernicious in that we
become, often unknowingly, the source and the cause of
our own infestation.
Second, pandemics are “declared.” As is the case with
catastrophic events in history, like wars, famines, or mass
cultural anomaly as bizarre as the Chinese Sorcery Scare
of 1768, whose duration and identity result from an act of
punctuation and sense-making entirely sociopolitical in
nature, pandemics too begins with a performative act that
announces their beginning and, having made them to
begin in this way, determines when they reach their end,
even though the viruses and their carriers may still be
with(in) us (see Kuhn, 1992). Naming not microbial activities in nature but a crisis for humans, pandemics are
events made real, public, and urgent, as just said, by a
performative—a speech act, to be exact—whose authority
in pronouncing their beginning and end depends on the
very force that makes the declaration authoritative and
forceful in the first place.
Brought into being by discourse and public communications, pandemics are social constructions; they signal a state
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of emergency—appearing, first, as physical ailments on the
part of individuals, subsequently identified and ratified by
medical and scientific community as a real health problem,
and finally materialized by authoritative broadcast and public acknowledgment, thereupon becoming a public policy
issue to be addressed by political leadership, all these over
a determinate territory. Once established as such, a pandemic individualizes a collective paroxysm, making it a
public enemy by giving it a face, a name, a certain life span
in the social calendar, without which the havocs wreaked by
the virus would not be the crisis its name designates and
invokes. It is in this declarative nature of pandemics that we
can see how viruses, once medicalized and publicly
acknowledged, are inevitably entangled with science, history, culture, and politics. Socially constructed by a decision, by a cut or break into regular time, they mark a “zone
of exception,” a temporal heterotopic, as it were, where we,
individually and collectively, stand to one another as equal
subjects to illness, unfreedom, and death in the unending
drama of man against nature and its hostile elements.
Viruses are viruses are viruses. They have no political
content; operating according to the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology, they come and go on their own rules and on
their own times, as nature dictates. In sharp contrast, pandemics are biopolitical phenomena; they are moments of
discontinuity or rupture in social order, shot through from
start to finish with forces and factors that shape culture, history, and economy, which in turn determine what they mean
and how they come about and come to pass. Moreover, and
importantly, a pandemic is not a single, monolithic event; it
is a series of localized epidemics, each with its own point of
origin, its own history, its own epidemiological pattern and
impacts. Further still, all these factors crisscross one another
in a complex, nonlinear fashion, amassing multiple agents
and stakeholders in such a critical fashion that the language
of war is often used by the authority in charge to quell the
infectious assault.9 Pandemics force social changes precisely because the changes they incur invite resistance. It is
for this reason, perhaps for this reason alone, that pandemics inevitably appear as a site of social contestations, politicizing and politicized by the heterogeneous constructions
barely betrayed by the name of a single virus.10 It is for this
reason too that pandemics assert themselves as a sign of
generalized cultural and economic strife, a symptom of
social struggle underlying the health terror that a viral
breakout unfailingly induces.
COVID-19 is a novel virus, novel in that scientists do
not fully understand how it afflicts the body and therefore
cannot predict its epidemiological paths. To control its
spread, we have no choice but to employ methods developed from past experiences, such as quarantine/isolation,
social distancing, face coverings, and contact tracing, to
name a few now well-known. Because viruses are infectious, to control its spread is, understandably, to separate
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and to isolate. This means that people be kept away from
one another. Instead of gathering or being together, we
make ourselves scare; better yet, we isolate ourselves, even
if begrudgingly. More than that, the injunction of isolation
leads straightaway to insulation in that the ultimate, foolproof means of isolation is to literally atomize ourselves, to
turn ourselves into windowless monads. Indeed, all the mitigation measures we hear about of late—quarantine, mask
wearing, hand washing, and social distancing—are in reality anti-social measures. Don’t reach out and don’t touch
anyone! Cover up your face! Just as social distancing—a
contradiction in terms of sorts—means keeping physical
distance, and just as mask wearing reduces mutual recognition based on simple vision to its unnatural minimum,
(self-)isolation and quarantine all but eliminate human contact of all kinds. When the plagues struck, we were all lepers; when COVID-19 strikes, we are all windowless
monads. Pandemics are born of communicable diseases, yet
for this reason, they force us to be incommunicable.
Flattening individuals and bringing to a halt exchange and
commerce of every kind, they turn a society into one that is
against society. If there is a history of pandemics, it is a history of anti-social history.
Neither alive nor dead, neither this nor that, viruses are
by nature improper. Never proper, that is, never being (of)
themselves, they appropriate—always ready to make others
their own. They are pure media, as suggested earlier. Viruses
are pure because they mediate unconditionally. However,
inasmuch as unconditional mediation performed by viruses
leads to the demise of their host, upon whom they depend
for their parasitic reproduction, viruses end up annihilating
themselves by their very nature; they are always already
their own collateral casualties. Rendering themselves nil by
simply being and subsisting as themselves, pure media are
no (longer) media. Unconditional mediation ends all mediations. By bringing society to go against itself, viruses commit suicide, so to speak, by killing their host, by the
unconditional abuse of others’ hospitality. And, alas, we—
at least some of us—are spared.

Normal Returns?
COVID-19 is a new virus. But, unlike the known flu viruses,
or H1N1, SARS, and the like, COVID-19 is considered
“novel,” not the least because, as indicated earlier, it frustrates scientists’ understanding. “It has been like nothing
else on Earth,” says an infectious-disease expert, who falls
victim to the virus; “I knew I had the disease; it couldn’t
have been anything else,” but “I don’t understand what’s
happening in my body” (Yong, 2020). There are many
things, inanimate or living, on Earth that are like nothing we
know so far, and there are many things happing in our body
that we do not understand at all. COVID-19 can justifiably
be called “novel,” but isn’t every virus novel in its own way
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and at some moment in time? Isn’t being novel the normal
course of event in life and in life sciences as well? “There is
novelty here,” remarks a prominent epidemiologist Karl
Friston upon leaving a lab meeting about COVID-19, but he
quickly adds, “so this, from my point of view, is just an
average day” (Kosner, 2020). Being novel is the very characteristic of all viruses and many other things in nature as
well. The novelty of COVID-19 may not be as novel as we
think.
What is possibly novel about COVID-19 is the fact that
it gives us the first pandemic in our truly globalized age.
The global village, in which we now live, is so hyper-connected—not only by technology but also through affluence,
commerce, and global travel—that an infectant can travel
from one city to another as fast as jet streams flow.
Connectivity translates qualitative diversity into measurable multiplicity, reducing distance and difference for the
formation of the common, which in turn strengthens connectivity. To be alive, as few would disagree, is to be connected, literally and in every other sense. But this means
that we must live in and with the risks that global connectivity brings to us. To be connected brings with it the possibility of being stranded in harm’s way. As COVID-19 makes
clear, “connectivity is the killer” (Kosner, 2020). After all,
life depends on maintaining boundaries and keeping differences. Deadly viruses are deadly because they breach them.
As infection rate rises, so does anxiety. And bleak scenes
spread as wide as the virus goes. Deserted streets, boardedup stores, closed factories, shot-down public transportations; remote learning, work-from-home; stock markets
crashed . . . and, worse yet, “I just lost my job.” Individual
solation leads quickly to desolation across the board. And
economy bears the brunt of a colossal coronal attack.
Shortly after COVID-19 spread out of Wuhan, China, to
Europe in January 2020, stories about the economic plight
began to top the list of topics in public forums and news
media. The future we face seems to lie in one of the two
choices: to die from hunger or to die from the disease (餓死
或病死), as the expressions go in Chinese media. It is not
for no reason that a policy brief released in June 2020 by the
United Nations on the impact of the pandemic is given the
title “The World of Work Cannot and Should Not Look the
Same After This Crisis” (Guterres, 2020). The address on
the launch of this brief, given by the Secretary-General
António Guterres (2020), begins as follows:
The Covid-19 pandemic has turned the world of work upside
down. Every worker, every business and every corner of the
globe has been affected. Hundreds of millions of jobs have
been lost . . . Many small and medium-sized enterprises—the
engine of the global economy—may not survive.

After painting a depressing picture of the future and explaining how difficult it will be for the world economy to return
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to “normal,” Guterres’s (2020) address makes a hardly perceptible turn when he says “let’s not forgot the pre-Covid-19
world was far from normal.” It seems then that, rather than
shattering the world of work as we know it, the COVID-19
pandemic simply exposes in higher resolution the “tremendous shortcomings, fragilities and fault lines” that have
been eroding society and economy from the bottom-up for
decades. The pre-COVID-19 world, in which we thought
we lived a normal life, is not as normal as we think (see
Guterres, 2020).
To save the economy under siege is to “return to normal”
as soon as possible, so cry the bureaucrats and journalists
alike. But what is “normal” in this case? What does “being
normal” mean exactly? Is the world, old or new, ever normal? There are norms regulating life, but has there ever
been a “normal life” as such? The so-called normal life, a
life before COVID-19, to which we pray to return, is in
truth one of recollection, a romantic one at that, as the UN
policy brief readily admits. Just as a viral infection may display more than one symptom on the part of its victims,
embody more than one single illness, and create more than
one single public health challenge, life, as it is actually
lived, is hardly reducible to one normal life. In fact, the socalled normal life is the one that brought us the pandemic in
the first place. To live is to live normally; to return to normal is what living is all about. The so-called new normal is
both new and not so new, which is to say, it is neither really
new nor really normal. Perhaps the world has never been
and will never be normal, whatever our idea of “being normal” means. If a pandemic can turn the world upside down,
it is because life has been turning and turning again. And
anything that returns cannot be entirely new.

Pandemics, quo vadis?
Humans have been haunted by viruses since time immemorial. From the prehistoric pandemics in northeastern China
5,000 years ago, uncovered at sites now called Hamin
Mangha and Miaozigou, to the Justinian plague (541–549
AD) that may have helped to bring down feudalism, or the
small pox outbreak that finally toppled the Aztec empire
before Hernán Cortés returned to the region in the spring of
1521, viral infections have tormented the lands and their
people over millennia. Traveling with host animals and
humans, viruses had gone global long before globalization
became a fact.
There are 10 known pandemics in the last 250 years, all
displaying the same pattern of spiking in seasonal waves
after the initial attacks. COVID-19, and some of its coronal
cousins, will undoubtedly expand the list. To those who are
living through its assault, the impacts brought about by
COVID-19 are more or less clear and more or less measurable. But what is the meaning of COVID-19 when the current pandemic is over? Will it be remembered? If so, in
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what way and to what extent? If the history of pandemics
has taught us anything, it is that history tends to repeat
itself, that viral outbreaks are an ineliminable part of the
natural history, in which humans are a part and in which no
“zone of being” is free from viral infection. Recall the
Spanish Flu of 1918, the worst pandemic during the last two
centuries. It is estimated to have wiped out 50 million people worldwide, meanwhile infecting 500 million, a third of
the world’s population at the time. However, despite its
short distance of mere one hundred years from us, few people today know much about it, and still fewer are able to
understand or feel the impact it had at that time. Its centenary a short time ago passed noiselessly, certainly not for
lack of stories or records. Like the many plagues before it,
the Spanish Flu, it seems, never quite made itself into what
Reinhart Koselleck (2018) calls the “the space of experience” (p. 34). Failing to make its way into collective memory, it is also helpless in figuring into our “horizon of
expectation” (Koselleck, 2018, p. 14). If the Spanish Flu
faded largely from memory, all the woes caused by COVID19 are, likewise, likely to dissipate in time, regardless of
how we feel and say about it now. There was a pre-coronavirus world, and there will be a post-coronavirus world, but
viruses, known or novel, will outlast our worlds.
Viruses are everywhere and forever. So, plagues will
never disappear for good (Camus, 1991, p. 307). But what
then does it mean, the pandemic? It is life, that is all. A
troubled memory, fading, under the vast indifference of the
sky. Until the gate of Oran closes again.

living thing to emerge from the blasted landscape was a
matsutake mushroom” (Tsing, 2015, p. 3). When human
history temporarily comes to a halt in disasters, matsutake,
and also viruses in our case, may well survive and continue
to thrive with their own stories. Histories are being made
every day by humans and non-humans alike; however, the
future for those histories to converge has still yet to come.
As demonstrated in the essays gathered here, while governments and the public are desperate to frame the virus in their
own social and political narratives, the virus also works
hard to inscribe its historicity on the earth and humans too.
If a message must be dispatched out to all at this juncture,
it is that for a future of collaborative survival, the stake of
living together has nothing to do with harmony and conquest,
but is derived from “disturbance-based ecologies” (Tsing,
2015, p. 5), that is, plagues. Plagues are life, that is all.

Conclusion (Xuefeng Feng and
Briankle G. Chang)

Notes

Assembled in this forum, the five short essays provide some
modest reflections on the coronavirus pandemic and its still
unfolding consequences. Committed to a variety of disciplinary perspectives and interests, the authors did not set
out by pursuing any preset direction or common agenda
supposedly carried out collectively in our intellectual labor.
Rather, what unifies the diverse inquiries in these essays is
the shared awareness about the confusion in the public discourse that constantly fails to distinguish a coronavirus
called COVID-19 from the COVID-19 pandemic, or as
Briankle reminds us in his essay, from “a series of localized
epidemics.” This alertness constitutes a common ground in
addressing specific issues or phenomena in these essays.
This forum is anything but comprehensive. If it can contribute to the discussion of the crisis, it is most likely
because all the essays refuse to bind the pandemic exclusively with the coronavirus and to position the virus and
humanity in rigid opposition to each other. In her multispecies ethnography, Anna Tsing tells a marvelous story about
matsutake mushrooms. “When Hiroshima was destroyed by
an atomic bomb in 1945,” says she, “it is said, the first
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1. In a trilogy of contemporary essays, Baudrillard (1995)
argued that the war in the desert was a new phenomenon,
because it was defined and shaped by its discursive aspect as
a form of television programming, regardless of what happened on the ground.
2. That earlier announcement called “demonetisation” led to
a vast contraction of commerce and an immiseration of a
majority of the population which has still not recovered, and
is now widely considered an unnecessary exercise of personal whimsy. For an analysis of the economic consequences,
see Ghosh et al. (2017).
3. The decline of Indian agriculture is not adequately discussed
in the celebration of urban growth. Its effects are however
inescapable and directly lead to the growth of informal settlements in cities (Balakrishnan, 2020; Jaffrelot & Thakker,
2020).
4. Mediatization, or the analysis of events with their mediated
construction as the starting point, is a phenomenon that has
grown in importance across cultural contexts, as media theorists attempt to understand the increasing influence of media
forms on culture, especially with the virtualization of human
interaction and the redefinition of community through the use
of social media and mobile communication. For a fuller discussion, see Couldry and Hepp (2013).

Li et al.
5. Re-examining her arguments in Citizenship and Its
Discontents: An Indian History (2013), Jayal (2019) traces
the current shift in the discourse of Indian citizenship from
an egalitarian rights-based model to a new regime predicated
on religious and cultural identity, given shape through the
concomitant technocratic frames of transactional welfare and
biometric identity.
6. Four short essays provide further context and narrate the
response: Shankar et al. (2020).
7. Partha Chatterjee’s (2004, 2011) insightful categorization of
Indian society separates the distinct ontological domain of a
small formal “civil society” that includes rights-bearing citizens, from the vast undifferentiated mass of the population
that constitutes “political society” and which forms the actual
locus of democratic practice.
8. The current Indian government has dramatically increased
the acquisition and use of big data in governance, including
a reliance on biometric identification for access to welfare
programs and the use of mobile phones for access to services:
Part of the government’s COVID-19 response was in the
form of a mandatory mobile application that purported to use
location tracking to show active virus infections in the user’s
vicinity. An analysis of its invasive nature can be found in a
working paper by Deb (2020).
9. Societies always declared war on problems they cannot
solve: war on drugs, war on poverty, and the like. It is no
surprise to see Donald Trump refers to COVID-19 as an
“invisible enemy” and calls himself a war-time president in
his speeches on the COVID-19 pandemic. Similar examples
abound across the board throughout history. It is widely recognized by epidemiologists today that the model developed
by John Snow based on the cholera outbreaks between 1831
and 1853 in England is too linear to be of any use in contemporary pandemics. Like the global climate instability or
financial market volatility, pandemics are nonlinear phenomena, displaying a high degree of uncertainty that defies
simple causal explanation. On this, see Kosner (2020).
10. It is therefore not surprising that we observe Donald Trump
repeatedly refers to COVID-19 as Wuhan virus or Kung Flu
in reaction to his rise and fall in poll and public opinion as he
tries to find scapegoat, in this case, China, for his sorry failure in handling the crisis. A virus is always more than a virus
when it enters the body politic.
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